Of all the defence mechanisms, only onedissociationis treated as a separate diagnostic category in the third edition of the 'Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders' (DSM-III) (American Psychiatric Association 1980). Delusional marital jealousy, for instance, could be classified as one of the projective disorders, but this is not done. A group of disorders based on dissociation should be easily defined and organized, in comparison with the relatively bewildering array of psychotic disturbances. Yet DSM-III does not provide a conceptually coherent set of dissociative diagnoses.
Diagnostic continua in other areas of DSM-I Schizophrenia: DSM-III takes into account the fact that psychoses must be diagnosed on a 'temporal continuum'. This continuum has therapeutic and prognostic implications, and it impels the clinician to be more careful in diagnosing schizophrenia. Thus a schizophrenia-like illness lasting less than two weeks and having a recognizable precipitant is called a brief reactive psychosis, and is listed among 'Psychotic Disorders Not Elsewhere Classified'. If a patient has a schizophrenia-like illness for more than two weeks but less than six months, the diagnosis is schizophreniform disorder. After six months, the diagnosis is schizophrenia.
Depression: A somewhat analogous temporal continuum is combined with a poorly operationalized 'continuum of severity' in the DSM-III diagnosis of depressions. Here the analogue of brief reactive psychosis is adjustment disorder with depressed mood (there is no adjustment disorder with psychotic features). On a continuum of severity there are five diagnoses for depression: adjustment disorder with depressed mood, dysthymic disorder, major depressive episode (MDE) without melancholia, and finally MDE with melancholia and MDE with psychotic features, both of which represent the severe end of the continuum.
Phobic disorders: In the phobic disorders there is a continuum of severity which is really based on the number of stimuli which generate a phobic response. This is in effect a 'continuum of pervasiveness of pathological response'. At one end of the continuum lies the simple phobia. In the middle lies social phobia, in which numerous situations sharing a common social element provoke a phobic response. When the phobic response is generalized to the largest number of stimuli, the most severe diagnosisagoraphobiais made.
Agoraphobia with or without panic attacks: TFhe classification ofphobic disorders along a single continuum of pervasiveness of pathological response is confounded by the existence of panic attacks. There is in effect a vertical axis to the diagnostic system in this part of DSM-III which is a 'hierarchical continuum'. Thus panic disorder and agoraphobia exist as independent entities. Agoraphobia with panic attacks is a hierarchically more inclusive diagnosis which includes both the other disorders. This arrangement is not consistent with the common learning theory approach to agoraphobia with panic attacks, according to which the agoraphobia is a secondary consequence of the primary panic disorder, as stated in DSM-III. It would make more sense to diagnose panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, which would eliminate the hierarchical continuum.
Pervasive developmental disorders: The pervasive developmental disorders of childhood are diagnosed according to age of onset, with prognosis thought to improve with later onset. This is a 'continuum of age of onset'. In DSM-III, infantile autism has an onset before the age of 30 months, while childhood onset pervasive developmental disorder begins after 30 months and before 12 years.
Mental retardation: Mental retardation may be diagnosed as mild, moderate, severe or profound according to the IQ. This particular form of a continuum of severity is worth noting because it is the only DSM-III diagnostic continuum based on valid and reliable psychological testing. It is in effect a 'continuum of test scores'.
Alcohol intoxication and withdrawal: Although withdrawal from alcohol or any other substance of abuse or addiction must be preceded by long-term use, the two diagnoses follow each other according to a 'continuum of physiological response', in which the withdrawal state is preceded temporarily by the intoxication. A physiological continuum exists for inhibition of sexual desire, excitement, orgasm and ejaculation also, in which an arrest at any one stage causes inhibition of the following stages.
Conduct disorder: The conduct disorders are conceptually related according to a 'grid design', with socialized and undersocialized on one axis and aggressive and non-aggressive on the other, resulting in four separate disorders.
Affective disorders: Here the organizing principle is 'polarity of symptoms', resulting in diagnoses of unipolar affective disorder or bipolar affective disorder, with bipolar subdivided into mixed, manic or depressed.
Paranoid disorder: In the paranoid disorders DSM-III gives recognition to the possibility of 'contagion of symptoms' as a way to conceptually link two diagnoses: paranoia and shared paranoid disorder. This is also one of the few areas of DSM-III where a systems approach is implied, and with it a 'gradient of psychopathology' from the primary delusional partner to the less severely disturbed and secondarily involved partner.
Personality disorders: DSM-III recognizes that the personality disorders are not a randomly assorted group of independent entities. They fall into three clusters: (1) paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal; (2) histrionic, narcissistic, borderline, antisocial; (3) avoidant, dependent, compulsive, passive aggressive. The principle inherent in this grouping of personality disorders is an overlapping sets or 'Venn diagram' system of organizing a diagnostic section of DSM-III.
Function of atypical diagnoses
The above is no doubt not an exhaustive list of the principles by which the diagnostic categories of DSM-III are organized. Every section of DSM-III has a concluding diagnostic entity referred to as 'atypical'. The atypical diagnoses are a recognition of the fact that no diagnostic system can be complete, that patients do not always fit into pigeon-holes, and that observation is imperfect. The atypical category does not have a prescribed logical relation to the diagnostic continuum or principle to which it is appended.
Atypical diagnoses are a necessary but not altogether satisfactory diagnostic compromise which function well enough in most areas of DSM-III. In the dissociative disorders section of DSM-III, however, the fact that partial forms of MPD are classified as atypical dissociative disorder reveals that the dissociative disorders are not organized in a conceptually coherent fashion.
Lack of an organizing principle in the dissociative disorders section of DSM-Ill Examination of the dissociative disorders reveals that there is no logical principle relating them one to the other in an organized fashion, other than the fact that they all involve pathological overuse of the same defence mechanism. It might be proposed that the organizing concept in the dissociative disorders section of DSM-III is a 'common defence mechanism', but that is not sufficient. The fact that the same defence mechanism is used does not link the disorders in a compelling way.
By analogy, it might be proposed that DSM-IV should contain a set of diagnoses called 'visual hallucinatory disorders'. This might include migraine aura, hallucinogen intoxication, alcohol withdrawal, paranoid schizophrenia, sundry hysteria states and mania. The organizing principle would be 'common perceptual disturbance'. Clearly, though, this is not the most important way of clinically understanding these heterogeneous disorders. The mere fact that a number of diagnoses share a common characteristic is not sufficient for them to be grouped together in a diagnostic manual.
There are two modifications of DSM-III which would bring conceptual order to the diagnosis of dissociative disorders. The first is to introduce dissociative states as a ninth diagnostic criterion for borderline personality disorder, a move supported by the work of Gunderson (Gunderson & Singer 1975 , Gunderson & Kolb 1978 , Gunderson et al. 1981 ). Since many atypical dissociative disorders presumably occur in borderlines, the diagnosis need not be made on Axis I, and it can be subsumed by the hierarchically more inclusive Axis II diagnosis. A DSM-IV rule would then be that the diagnosis of atypical dissociative disorder cannot be made on Axis I when there is a borderline personality disorder diagnosis on Axis II. There may be those who believe that psychogenic amnesia, fugue states and depersonalization disorder diagnoses should also not be made in borderlines. At present this provision is made only for depersonalization disorder. MPD, if entrenched and stable, is such an extraordinary diagnosis that it might be permitted to stand independently on Axis I even in borderlines, if only to promote research.
The second modification of DSM-III would be to introduce an organizing principle into the diagnostic scheme for dissociative disorders. This would have utility in the absence of an Axis II borderline diagnosis (since narcissistic, histrionic and antisocial personalities are closely related to and difficult to distinguish from borderline psychopathology, it is possible that all four diagnoses should rule out an atypical dissociative disorder). I propose that dissociative disorders be thought of as lying on a continuum of increasingly large amounts of ego dissociated'.
Dissociative disorders on a continuum of increasingly large amounts of ego dissociated
At one end of the spectrum would be psychogenic amnesia in its most transient forms. At the other extreme would be the most fully developed MPDs. Fugue states and depersonalization would occupy intermediate positions depending on their severity, but would never be as severe as MPD or as benign as a brief isolated amnesia. Many atypical dissociative disorders would not appear on Axis I because they would be checked off as diagnostic criteria on Axis II. Those remaining would not have a necessary logical relation to their parent diagnostic continuum, in conformity with other areas of DSM-III. Partial forms of MPD would occupy an intermediate point of the spectrum somewhere in the region of fugue states and depersonalization. It would not make sense to call the midpoint of the spectrum 'atypical dissociative disorder'; that would be a marked departure from the function of the atypical diagnoses in other areas of DSM-III. The question arises whether partial forms of MPD are common enough, clinically significant in terms of management or prognosis, or in any other way worthy of a separate diagnostic label. Orne et al. (1984) have stated that there is clinical utility in making a specific diagnosis of MPD, partial form. In the same paper they refer to the continuum of dissociative disorder with MPD at the extreme end. I have not introduced a new idea here, rather a refinement and formalization of principles already inherent in the literature, as illustrated in Table 1 . Likewise, others have discussed the relationship between MPD and borderline personality. Fast (1974) has formulated multiple identities in a single patient in terms of borderline object relationships and the separation-individuation phase of development. Gruenwald (1977) believes that borderline splitting and the dissociative defence leading to MPD are qualitatively similar. In a later paper, Gruenwald (1984) develops her thesis in terms of self psychology.
In an analysis of 33 cases, Horevitz & Braun (1984) found that 70% suffered from borderline personality disorder. They concluded that the diagnosis of borderline personality is related to the overall dysfunction of the patient, but not to the existence of MPD per se. They further concluded that MPD is a separate and distinct disorder, a view consistent with the position taken in this paper.
The relationship between borderline personality and MPD has implications not just for DSM-IV, but for a wide range of issues in psychiatric theory (Ross 1984) . Though our knowledge is incomplete, I believe that the proposed modifications of DSM-III are justified by our collective clinical experience to date.
